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Abstract
The uncanny valley effect (UVE) is a negative emotional response experienced when encountering
entities that appear almost human. Research on the UVE typically investigates individual, or
collections of, near human entities but may be prone to methodological circularity unless the
properties that give rise to the emotional response are appropriately defined and quantified.
In addition, many studies do not sufficiently control the variation in human likeness portrayed
in stimulus images, meaning that the nature of stimuli that elicit the UVE is also not well defined or
quantified. This article describes design criteria for UVE research to overcome the above
problems by measuring three variables (human likeness, eeriness, and emotional response) and
by using stimuli spanning the artificial to human continuum. These criteria allow results to be
plotted and compared with the hypothesized uncanny valley curve and any effect observed can be
quantified. The above criteria were applied to the methods used in a subset of existing UVE
studies. Although many studies made use of some of the necessary measurements and controls,
few used them all. The UVE is discussed in relation to this result and research methodology more
broadly.
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Introduction
The idea that there is something odd about entities that fall into a uncanny valley (UV)
between human and artificial has become a popular research area for disciplines such as
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robotic engineering, human-computer interaction, and psychology. This area of enquiry has
progressed from its origins in 1970 as an untested thought experiment to become an
established field which is developing ways of investigating the uncanny valley effect (UVE)
and the perception of near human entities (NHEs). Research may address how we perceive
humanity, and how we can improve designs for the appearance and behavior of artificial
entities, and findings may develop our thinking about life in a future world where interactions
with near-human and virtual entities will become commonplace. However, undertaking any
research into the UV is more complex than it may initially appear. In particular, there is the
potential for problems to arise in even establishing the existence of the UVE due to the use of
circular methodology. This arises because of a tendency to see an entity as eliciting a UVE
simply because it appears eerie, coupled with a tendency for an entity to be perceived as eerie
simply because it is of near-human appearance. Research that subjectively selects potential
UVE entities is, therefore, problematic, and instead, it may be important for research to
consider definitions of characteristics such as human likeness and eeriness that can be more
appropriately operationalized. The aim of the current article is to consider what
methodological difficulties arise when studying the UVE, and how they might be overcome
to produce research which is able to more objectively quantify and measure the effect.
What Is the UVE?
The idea of the UVE originated in robot design and described an unusual pattern in how
emotional responses to artificial entities changed with their increasing human likeness. As
entities began to take on human characteristics, they initially seemed more appealing and
likeable but this only held true up to a certain point, because when those characteristics
became convincingly close to human, the entities suddenly seemed eerie and unsettling
instead of more acceptable. This sudden dip in emotional response is the valley component
of the term. It was deemed an UV because the responses to those NHEs were ones of unease
or disquiet. The UVE was originally described by Mori (1970) who suggested that zombies,
corpses, prosthetic hands, and Japanese Noh masks would fall into this valley. More recently,
it has been given as a reason for why all sorts of nearly human-looking entities are perceived
to be creepy.
Mori’s account of the UVE was translated from Japanese to English by MacDorman
(2005) and depicted by using a graph with axes of human likeness and familiarity. Moving
and still entities were plotted in separate curves. Human likeness ranged from the extremely
artificial (an industrial robot) to completely human (a healthy living person). The original
term used was shinwakan, a word relating to ‘‘familiarity,’’ ‘‘likableness,’’ ‘‘comfort level,’’
and ‘‘affinity.’’ In the translation, ‘‘familiarity’’ was the chosen term which proved complex to
define, partly due to it having two meanings in English (an absence of novelty or a sense of
closeness), leading to it being variously interpreted as meaning ‘‘positive affect,’’ ‘‘increasing
affinity,’’ and ‘‘emotional warmth’’ (Ho & MacDorman, 2010). The curves described for
moving and still entities both initially increase in familiarity as human likeness increases
until the 60% to 65% human point where familiarity begins to decrease, finally reaching
its lowest point at around 75% to 80% human. After this point, it rises steeply again until the
highest familiarity is reached for a moving and healthy human being. The curves vary in
magnitude according to whether the entities are still or moving, but on both there is a distinct
dip in familiarity between 75% and 90% human where familiarity plummets, signaling that
the entities are perceived as eerie, and this dip forms the UV.
When considering the precise nature of the UVE and its component dimensions, it is
important to remember that Mori’s original article (Mori, 1970/2012) was written for
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Japanese robotics engineers and not intended as a scientific exploration of a psychological
phenomenon. The nature of Mori’s original conceptualization of the UVE is demonstrated
by two occasions when he revisited the theory after publishing the original paper. In 2005, he
reflected on his decision to place corpses in the UV and suggested that when someone dies,
their lack of animation can be unsettling, but if death released them from suffering or
uncertainty then the stillness may also suggest that the person is now at peace, and this
peaceful aspect may moderate any sense of uncanniness (Mori, 2005). He also suggested
that it may have been wrong to position human beings as the highest point on the original
curve, because idealized portrayals of the human form exist (e.g., in some Buddhist statues)
which can appear more elegant, calm, and dignified than genuine humans. In an interview
with Kageki (2012), Mori also suggested that the UVE may be caused by the viewer
discovering a deception that the entity is not actually as human as it appears, and it is
the discovery of a deceptively human appearance that causes eeriness when the familiarity
drops away.
It is clear then that the origins of the UVE were not the result of scientific observation or
experimentation, but more of an untested, theoretical construct aimed primarily at the
aesthetics of robot design. As well as the problems of translating factors such as shinwakan
that were mentioned earlier, problems also existed in the seemingly arbitrary placement of
entities along the human likeness axes. For example, a stuffed animal was determined to be
more human looking than was a humanoid robot, a distinction which is arguable and
demonstrates that the formulation of the UV graph was not based on systematic, scientific
categorization. Since Mori’s work was translated into English by MacDorman (2005), it has
gained considerable attention, including in research that has attempted to identify and test
the various elements involved to establish an empirical approach to the UVE, particularly in
terms of reliably identifying what attributes of an entity might evoke a sense of eeriness.
Why Is Circularity a Problem?
If it is possible to replicate the curve described by Mori (1970/2012) using experimental or
observational methods, then this would provide empirical support for the UVE and be a
baseline from which to explore its causes. One important point to bear in mind is that
observing negative emotional reactions to certain entities is not by itself sufficient evidence
for the existence of the UVE, and instead, it is necessary to demonstrate that the reaction to
these entities fall within a ‘‘valley’’ when both the nature of the stimuli and the reaction are
plotted on a graph using sufficiently calibrated measurements. Given the need for such
calibration, it would seem reasonable that any study trying to show whether or not the
UVE exists, or trying to explain the reasons behind it, should include measurement of
human likeness, eeriness, and an emotional response. This emotional response may be the
strange-familiar dimension depicted in Mori (1970/2012)’s graph, or more recent
interpretations of affinity and warmth, such as Ho and MacDorman (2010).
One possible method of studying the UVE empirically is to collect examples of different
NHEs and ask people how eerie they appear. However, there is a risk of methodological
circularity in using such an approach, in that certain NHEs may be judged as eerie simply
because they appear near-human rather than human or artificial (and hence likely to fall into
the UV), and they are considered as examples of things that must belong to the UV because
they look eerie. In conducting empirical studies of the UVE it is important to consider,
therefore, how examples of NHEs are chosen, how the key characteristics of human
likeness and familiarity are established, and how the emotional response to NHEs is
defined and measured. If the examples are arbitrarily or subjectively selected, then
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although the findings may identify UV-like response patterns to those entities, it is not
possible to draw conclusions about the existence of a UV; instead, it is only possible to
conclude that such images appear to invoke a feeling of eeriness in those that encounter
them. To provide evidence for the UVE, it is necessary to clearly and definitively position the
NHEs in terms of their human likeness and familiarity, and quantify the emotional responses
to the stimuli, in comparison to both more and less human like images.
Design Principles for Researching the UVE
If the UVE exists, then it should be possible to replicate the graph Mori described using
empirical data. Table 1 draws together a set of design principles, and a test that will assist
such an endeavor. They are based a review of UVE studies conducted to date.
Items 1 and 2 are included to avoid the methodological circularity that arises when
choosing an arbitrary selection of a small number of stimuli based on their near-human
appearance, for example different types of androids or toys. A transition from nonhuman
to human should be objectively quantified either by transforming a nonhuman gradually
toward human or by ensuring that human likeness is rated independently from the other
measurements. A minimum of five points is suggested because this is the smallest practical set
that would include human and nonhuman anchors, and sufficient examples of NHEs that
could feasibly allow a valley to be plotted. However, including stimuli at more than five
points in that continuum would be preferable if the aim of the research is to precisely
identify the location of the dip in the UV curve. Measuring eeriness in addition to
Table 1. Research Design Principles and Test for Investigating the UVE.
(1) Stimuli should cover a range of levels of human likeness, with a minimum of five points including human
and nonhuman anchor points. It is not possible to draw conclusions about a continuum of human likeness
when only two illustrative points are being compared or when the range does not include a human and
nonhuman anchor. A full range would include 0% and 100% human, and 25%, 50%, and 75% human
likeness.
(2) To produce the graph’s X axis, the human likeness of the stimuli displaying the identified quality should be
controlled or measurable. Control would involve the selection of stimuli that vary in their human likeness
in a systematic way (e.g., computer-generated entities or morphs between human and nonhuman) but if
this is not possible, the stimuli should be independently rated to measure their human likeness.
(3) The Yaxis of the graph, labeled as familiarity, represents the emotional response or reaction to the stimuli.
This is not as clear-cut as the human likeness dimension as there are many different interpretations of
what could be meant by this axis. Therefore, the emotion that is being measured should be defined and, to
ensure psychological validity, response scales should be grounded in empirical evidence relating to human
emotions.
(4) A rating of eeriness should be collected from participants for each of the stimuli in addition to the
familiarity or emotional response measure. Without it, any observed valley could be explained as a mere
dip in response to the stimuli, and it would not be possible to confidently assert that the valley was
uncanny in its nature.
(5) If the principles earlier have been followed, it is possible to plot the two measurements of human likeness
and emotional response against each other. To show a valley effect, the path described by the response
measurement should display a single clear dip or deviation from a linear path, occurring somewhere
between 50% and 100% on the human likeness axis. When this is considered against the ratings of
eeriness, it should be possible to decide whether this represents an uncanny valley or not.
UVE¼ uncanny valley effect.
4 i-Perception 0(0)
familiarity (Items 5 and 3) allows the researcher to identify which stimuli were most closely
associated with eeriness and then to explore these in more detail in further research to arrive
at an understanding of the causes of the UVE. Types of emotional response that could be
measured here include acceptability, warmth, pleasantness, and familiarity itself. Items 4 and
5 would allow researchers to see whether a pattern emerges that approximates the path
described by Mori (1970/2012). This would mean that the stimuli falling into the valley
would be those displaying high ratings of eeriness. Item 5 tests whether a valley can be
described by examining whether there is a deviation from a linear trend in the relation
between human likeness and emotional response. The ratings collected when Item 4 is
used would allow a conclusion to be drawn whether it is uncanny or not.
Reviewing the Principles Against UVE Research
There has been a considerable amount of research carried out into the UVE since 2005.
(See Ka¨tsyri, Fo¨rger, & Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen, 2015, for a recent summary.) Studies were included
in the present review if they were published between 2005 and 2016, collected primary data
from participants, and had at least one research aim which included empirically testing
whether the UVE existed, exploring why it might occur, or quantifying a relation between
human likeness and eeriness. These studies have been categorized according to the type
of research area they considered. Table 2 indicates which of the five principles were met
for each study.
It can be seen that 7 of these 33 studies met all five of the criteria that have been proposed
here (Burleigh et al., 2013; Green et al., 2008; MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016;
MacDorman & Entezari, 2015; MacDorman et al., 2009; Mathur & Reichling, 2015;
Thompson et al., 2011). These covered research into anomalous features, categorical
perception, empathy, error sensitivity, and perceptual mismatch which supports Ka¨tsyri
et al.’s (2015) conclusion from a review of current research that perceptual mismatch
theory provides good evidence for the existence of the UVE. These studies did not all find
the valley deviation at the same position, and several found the most eerie stimuli were those
at the midpoint of the human likeness continuum, rather than very close to the human
endpoint as Mori (1970/2012) proposed. This suggests that if the valley exists it may not
always occupy the region closest to human likeness.
While conducting this review, it became apparent that there is some inconsistency between
the studies in their results and conclusions. This is the case for studies that have been
categorized as applying the principles in their stimuli selection and measurement choices
but that did not find a UVE but more so in the studies that have drawn conclusions about
the UVE without all of those measures or controls in place. For example, Seyama and
Nagayama (2007) concluded that infective processing mechanisms may be responsible for
causing the UVE but without a measurement of eeriness in their studies it is hard to know if
there was anything actually uncanny about the stimuli they tested. Studies that used a single
android stimulus (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2012) or which did not use human anchors for
comparison (e.g., Woods, 2006) can provide useful suggestions as to what might cause the
UVE but cannot provide evidence that these would apply to other androids or to entities
which are nearly but not quite human in general. This highlights a difficulty in making
comparisons between studies which have taken different approaches to the same problem
of testing the UVE. It would be considerably easier to compare several studies if a consistent
approach had been taken to measuring how human like and eerie their stimuli appeared to
participants. Therefore, applying these principles in future research would help to build on
those studies reported earlier that did meet all the criteria and found a UVE.
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Conclusions
The principles and test earlier were formulated as a design framework that could guide future
research seeking to investigate the nature and causes of the UVE. By quantifying key
variables, problems arising from methodological circularity can be avoided. The principles
are not intended to be a prescriptive framework given the complexities involved in some of
the approaches taken. For example, the field of category boundaries and categorical
perception presents particular challenges where distinct measurements of perceptions of
human likeness as defined here may overlap with the human likeness dimension measured
in discrimination tasks (Cheetham et al., 2013). By comparing a range of research over
several years and finding seven studies that met all the criteria and demonstrated an UVE,
it has become apparent that these principles are certainly being applied by some researchers
and so are not proposed as novel in their own right. Certainly, research in recent years does
seem to have adopted these principles to good effect. However, these have not previously
been drawn together as a framework of guiding principles to help as many studies as possible
avoid the circularity problem. It is hoped that in setting out these principles and giving
examples of how they have and have not been applied, this article will assist those seeking
to contribute to a fuller understanding of the UVE, and explanations for why, and how,
it can evoke its characteristic and unsettling response.
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